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Abstract 
 
Enterprise blockchain applications can allow 
trading partners to transact directly without relying 
on trusted third parties and promise to: eliminate the 
need for reconciliations, instantly track and trace 
assets through a supply chain, provide unbeatable 
data provenance, settle transactions quickly and 
cheaply, and enable an information security model 
that is fault tolerant, resilient, and available. Many of 
these promised benefits seemingly address the 
challenges of non-blockchain based inter-
organizational systems. However, this research 
indicates that blockchain based inter-organizational 
applications pose significant challenges of their own. 
Based on interview and participant observation data, 
we identified five challenges: (1) competing 
blockchain standards, (2) adjusting to different 
shared governance models, (3) intellectual property 
concerns (4) industrial espionage risks, and (5) 
regulatory uncertainty. We also identified emerging 
practices stakeholders are using to address those 
challenges when considering enterprise blockchain 
applications. 
 
1. Introduction  
Use of blockchain technologies in the 
interorganizational enterprise applications context 
has garnered tremendous attention in the industry. 
Reports and opinions predict that blockchain based 
enterprise applications will revolutionize business 
and reshape the economy [3, 9, 12, 26]. Enterprises 
are interested in blockchain technologies because 
they promise a significant amount of business value 
by providing the ability to transact directly with 
trading partners without the use of trusted third 
parties, eliminating the need for reconciliations, 
instantly tracking and tracing assets, providing data 
provenance, settling transactions quickly and cheaply 
and enabling a resilient information security posture. 
Put simply, blockchain based applications promise to 
solve many types of issues (e.g., those related to 
technical aspects, governance, transparency, 
efficiency, transaction costs, provenance, information 
security, and so on.) surrounding existing 
interorganizational systems [9, 10]. 
Despite the explosion of interest, our prior research 
found that there were very few enterprise blockchains 
applications in production in 2017-2018 
notwithstanding the billions of dollars in blockchain 
investments worldwide [12], the thousands of proofs-
of-concepts across all industries, and the high-profile 
groups like R3, Hyperledger Project and Enterprise 
Ethereum Alliance working to facilitate enterprise 
adoption. A 4th quarter 2017 study of 200 blockchain 
projects by HfS, a research and consulting firm, 
corroborates our findings. HfS found that 90 to 95 
percent of enterprises were still conceptualizing 
blockchains, conducting proof-of-concepts or piloting 
applications. Only 5 to 10 percent of pilots were 
progressing to production [8].  What’s taking so 
long? 
Indeed, while generally sharing the optimism, 
some have expressed concerns about the hype 
surrounding blockchain applications in business 
contexts [9] suggesting that significant issues must be 
overcome before the promise of blockchain 
technologies is realized. Others have argued that 
many of the issues surrounding existing 
interorganizational systems, such as interoperability 
concerns, will manifest within the blockchain 
contexts as well [23]. Yet others have compared 
blockchain technologies to the proverbial “hammer 
looking for the nails,” arguing that many of the 
potential business applications blockchain is being 
tested for, do not need blockchains and existing 
institutions, applications etc. may be just enough [7]. 
Unfortunately, little is empirically known on just 
what challenges organizations are facing so as to 
shed light on the potential of blockchain technologies 
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in the enterprise context. There’s even less empirical 
basis to determine what organizations are doing to 
address those challenges as they explore and develop 
blockchain applications.  
This paper addresses this gap and contributes to the 
practice and research of interorganizational systems 
by empirically exploring the preliminary challenges 
organizations are facing in adoption of blockchain 
technologies and by identifying emerging best 
practices for addressing those challenges. We draw 
on data from a broader multi-year, mixed-method 
research program to specifically addresses the 
following questions: 
• What challenges to adoption of enterprise 
blockchain applications do enterprises face? 
• What practices are enterprises using to address 
those challenges? 
Understanding these challenges and organizational 
practices to address them is important both from a 
practice perspective and from a theoretical 
perspective. To the extent organizations see potential 
for business value, we believe that a better 
understanding of challenges and best practices is 
crucial for any real progress. On the other hand, if 
indeed, there are significant issues that cannot be 
overcome in feasible ways then it is also important to 
take note. From a theory perspective, senior 
Information Systems (IS) scholars have often 
reminded us to pay attention to the Information 
Technology (IT) artifacts due to the crucial role they 
play in shaping organizations and societies [14, 22]. 
To the extent, one considers the very nature of 
blockchain technologies as fundamentally different 
than previous generations of technological 
innovations and to the extent that one appreciates the 
truly transformative and upending potential of 
blockchain technologies [24], it becomes imperative 
to better understand and study blockchain’s evolution 
into the context of business applications. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. To 
orient readers new to blockchain technologies, 
section 2 provides some background and overview of 
a blockchain application as an inter-organizational 
trading system. Section 3 briefly describes our 
research methods. Section 4 presents the findings 
related to five challenges and five emerging practices 
for addressing them. Section 4 provides discussion, 
limitations, and directions for future research. 
2.  Background  
A blockchain application “is a distributed, peer-to-
peer system for validating, time-stamping, and 
permanently storing transactions on a distributed 
ledger that uses cryptography to 
authenticate digital asset ownership and asset 
authenticity and consensus algorithms to add 
validated transactions to the ledger and to ensure the 
ongoing integrity of the ledger’s complete history” 
[10]. Blockchain technologies are commonly 
associated with cryptocurrencies operating with a 
permissionless1 model. While enterprises are 
interested in the underlying technologies that drive 
these blockchains, they require more control in the 
form of permissioned2 blockchain applications. 
Moreover, a majority of potential enterprise use-cases 
of blockchain technologies revolve around inter-
organizational systems.  
In other words, by their very nature, enterprise 
blockchain applications involve a network of 
stakeholders (business networks, business-
government-quasi-government networks, etc.) where 
                                                          
1 Permissionless blockchain applications like 
Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Stellar do not restrict 
access—anyone with access to the Internet may 
participate.  
2 Permissioned blockchain applications restrict 
access to pre-authorized users and will likely be built 
on protocols designed for enterprise adoption, such as 
Hyperledger Fabric, R3 Corda, Chain, Multichain, 
and Quorum discussed in this paper. 
the nature of the transactions as well as the standards 
and inter-organizational frameworks within which 
those transactions would be executed, need to be 
coordinated among the diverse stakeholders. Further, 
the technological standards and regulatory 
underpinnings must also be delineated. 
2.1 A Blockchain Application as an Inter-
organizational Trading System 
 A distributed blockchain application performs the 
vital functions of trusted third-parties (TTPs) by 
using computer algorithms and cryptography instead 
of relying on institutions to mitigate counter-party 
risks.  Enterprises are interested in permissioned 
blockchain applications, which restrict access to 
authorized users and the rights or roles of those 
authorized users (see Figure 1).  
Permissioned blockchains rely upon a front-end 
gatekeeper to enforce the rights of access. Unlike a 
trusted-third party that sits in the middle of 
transactions, the gatekeeper is like a security guard 
that checks a badge before allowing entry. It has no 
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ability to alter the ledger or to stop smart contracts 
from executing.3 
Transactions on the shared ledger are immutable, 
thus every party can be confident they are dealing 
with the same data. With one version of the truth 
transparent to all parties, there are no reconciliations, 
enabling faster settlement times and lower transaction 
costs. 
Organization B
(Node 2)
Organization A
(Node 1)
Ledger X
Organization C
(Node 3)
Ledger X
Regulator
(Node 4)
Ledger X
Permissioned Blockchain 
Trading System
Ledger X
E 1 2 3E 1 2
E 1 3 E 1 2 3
Observe only
Gatekeeper
E
Public States:
Every member of the permissioned 
blockchain network may access the 
public state transactions
Private States:
Only parties to a particular Smart 
Contract can access the private state 
transactions
1 2 3
 
Figure 1. Permissioned blockchain trading system 
with three trading partners, one regulator and no 
TTP. Organization A is party to smart contracts 1 
and 3 but cannot observe smart contract 2; 
Organization B is party to smart contracts 1, 2, and 
3; Organization C is party to smart contracts 1 and 2 
but cannot observe smart contract 3; The regulator 
in this example is granted observation only access 
to all transactions. 
Use of cryptography-based identity and 
authentication in conjunction with immutability 
further enhances assurances of authorized access and 
data integrity. Permissioned blockchains can also use 
                                                          
3 This is true provided that the organization that 
serves as the gatekeeper operates fewer than 50 
percent of the nodes; If a gatekeeper does operate 50 
percent or more of the nodes, there is little point in 
using a blockchain except under specific 
circumstances, such as an intra-organizational 
blockchain across divisions and if concerns about 
organizational control are not an issue for the 
particular application.   
smart contracts4 to nuance roles within a blockchain 
application. Particular parties may play different roles 
within different smart contracts, such as observe, 
transact, validate, and add transactions to the ledger.  
For example, a permissioned blockchain may use 
smart contracts to create multiple, separate mini-
ledgers as depicted in Figure 1. 
Blockchain applications also promise heightened 
availability (a key security objective). Blockchain 
applications still function properly even if a high 
percentage of nodes are faulty—or even malicious—
enabling resiliency and 100 percent availability. In 
theory, the only way to break a blockchain 
application is to commandeer more than 50 percent 
of the nodes before any of the other nodes notice. 
In summary, the potential relative advantages of 
blockchain applications compared to trading systems 
that rely on TTPs are: 
• The ability to transact directly 
• No need for reconciliations  
• Instant tract and trace of assets 
• Reliable data provenance  
• Control over one’s own identity  
• Faster settlement times 
• Lower transaction costs 
• Reduced threat of opportunism because 
agreements execute automatically  
• Heightened security that is fault tolerant, 
redundant, and available 
Despite the immense promised value, our research 
and industry reports suggest that adoption is still in 
nascent stages [8]. This slow pace has been attributed 
to technology immaturity and significant challenges 
that must be overcome. This paper focuses on 
identifying those challenges and emerging practices 
organizations are using to address them. 
3. Research Methods 
As mentioned above, this paper draws on a broader 
multi-year, mixed-method research program on use 
of blockchain technologies in enterprise contexts. In 
2017, the lead author joined the Center for 
Information Systems Research, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology as a Visiting Scholar to lead a 
research project on how enterprises were exploring 
blockchains. The research team included Jeanne 
Ross, Principal Research Scientist, and Kate 
Moloney, Research Specialist. In this paper, we 
report findings based on analyses of interview and 
                                                          
4 A smart contract is a piece of software that stores 
and then executes the terms of an agreement between 
parties. 
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participant observation data drawn from this broader 
research program. 
3.1 Interviews 
During interviews, we asked managers about their 
blockchain adoption journeys, their participation in 
blockchain ecosystems, and the practices and lessons 
they have learned so far.  We asked research 
participants the following questions: 
• How is the organization building blockchain 
capabilities? What strategies are being considered? 
Which applications are deemed to be the most 
promising, are already under development, or have 
been deployed? 
• What challenges do organizations need to 
overcome to deploy blockchain applications into 
production? What are the key project and change 
management practices? How well have expectations 
been met so far? What are the preliminary outcomes 
and lessons learned?  
As of this writing, confidential interviews were 
conducted with 38 key informants in 30 
organizations. In order to minimize the potential for 
bias, we selected highly knowledgeable interview 
participants representing diverse perspectives, 
industries, and organizational characteristics [4]. We 
interviewed blockchain innovation leaders in large 
US national or global firms, including leaders from 
six global financial services firms, three global 
manufacturers, and two US healthcare providers. We 
have permission to specifically cite BNP Paribas, JP 
Morgan, Moog, and State Street as examples. We 
also interviewed blockchain heads in professional 
services firms, service providers, startups and 
nonprofit organizations. We conducted interviews in 
19 such organizations, of which we have permission 
to cite Axiom, Blockchain of Things, Capgemini, 
Center for Supply Chain Studies, Cognizant, KPMG, 
LO3 Energy, and Stellar.  
3.2 Participant Observation 
The lead author also participated in the Center for 
Supply Chain Studies’ project to define blockchain 
standards for tracing pharmaceuticals through the 
United States (U.S.) supply chain. The project 
examined ways the pharmaceutical industry can 
comply with the U.S. Drug Supply Chain Security 
Act (DSCSA) of 2013. The law requires that by year 
2023 all parties in the U.S. supply chain must trace 
certain classes of pharmaceuticals from source to 
destination. Bob Celeste, Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Founder of the Center for Supply Chain 
Studies, led the group of about 50 participants who 
represented pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
wholesalers, distributors, and retail and hospital 
pharmacies.  The lead author was a participant in the 
event and took extensive notes aimed at capturing the 
key aspects of the issues and discussions. When 
possible, the lead author asked clarifying questions to 
other participants. This experience helped the lead 
author to better understand the perceived benefits, 
challenges, and concerns that supply chain partners 
have about shared blockchain applications. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Interview and participant observation data were 
analyzed in an inductive and iterative fashion to help 
themes emerge and coalesce into 1) the major 
challenges in applying blockchain technologies for 
enterprise applications, and 2) the best practices 
indicated by the participants to help address those 
challenges. All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed into over 500 pages of text. Notes from 
participation observation were also analyzed. We 
followed a two-stage process. During the first stage 
of data analysis, we attempted to identify themes 
pertaining to organizational actions in exploring 
enterprise blockchain applications. The lead author 
read each interview and participant observation notes 
and coded the data to extract themes. Five major 
themes emerged from this process. When possible, 
details about specific blockchain technologies or 
consortia were compiled and written to supplement 
discussion of major themes by using those 
technologies or consortia as paradigmatic of the 
underlying theme. For example, when discussing a 
diversity of blockchain standards, we researched and 
presented four such major standards to highlight the 
issue.  
During the second stage, we focused our attention 
on what participants identified as important best 
practices aimed at addressing each emergent 
challenge identified during the first-stage of analysis. 
When a particular best practice emerged, we explored 
the industry literature and our interview and 
participant observation data to identify instances of 
the emergent best practices or specific organizations 
employing them, to serve as exemplars in our 
research findings.  
After the initial themes pertaining to challenges 
and best practices emerged, we next created written 
summaries (aimed at a practitioner audience). The 
summary write-ups were then sent to each participant 
who was quoted and the participant was requested to 
review their excerpt for accuracy. Participants made 
suggested revisions to improve clarity and precision. 
Separately, the lead author wrote a case study based 
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on participant observation data. This case study was 
then reviewed and edited based on input from the 
CEO of the case study site, Center for Supply Chain 
Studies. Each participant was asked whether they 
preferred to remain anonymous or to be identified. 
Fifteen participants granted permission to use their 
names and titles. 
4. Findings 
Our analyses revealed five major challenges that 
participants believe must be overcome before broader 
adoptions of blockchain technologies in enterprise 
contexts. Specifically, participants identified (1) 
competing blockchain standards, (2) adjusting to 
shared governance models, (3) intellectual property 
concerns (4) industrial espionage risks, and (5) 
regulatory uncertainty. We next explore each 
challenge and the emerging practices to address 
them. 
4.1 Competing Blockchain Standards: The 
Race is Afoot 
Our data suggest that a variety of different 
underlying blockchain standards are taking shape 
during the initial exploration of the use-cases as well 
as technological bases of blockchains. It appears that 
an assortment of industry alliances and consortia are 
competing in the standards arena. 
“The way we go about investing in blockchain is 
really multifaceted since nobody knows today which 
players will prevail…you cannot put all your eggs in 
one basket, so we have a very diversified approach 
with whom we work on the blockchain.” — Jacques 
Levet, Head of Transaction Banking, EMEA at BNP 
Paribas 
Blockchain standards are needed to specify rights 
of access and the rules for how transactions in a 
blockchain application will authenticate asset 
ownership and asset authenticity, how transactions 
will be structured, addressed, transmitted, routed, 
validated, sequenced, secured, and added to the 
permanent record. Standards will serve as the 
blueprints to ensure the integrity of records. As of 
year-end 2017, participants reported that many 
different groups are working on standards, but no one 
standard had emerged.  Therefore, most of the 
research participants pursue the following practice: 
Practice 1. Participate broadly in blockchain 
workgroups 
As the following quote attests, most of our 
interviewees are participating in a number of 
blockchain working groups to define standards 
because they are not sure which working group will 
ultimately prevail:  
 “So, from a strategy point of view, it's early days. 
We're probably in the situation that all the other big 
financial institutions are at the moment. Nobody's 
really backing one [consortium]. We're all trying to 
get to know as much about it as possible and see 
where it takes us. All we know is that it's going to be 
extremely disruptive.”  — IT Consultant and 
Architect for an Africa-based bank 
Working groups, including consortia and non-
profits, are defining blockchain standards and 
developing code bases and proof-of-concepts for 
business applications.  As of August 2017, Deloitte 
identified 40 major consortia, of which 26 were 
focused on financial services, 10 were cross-sector, 
and three were in healthcare [6]. 
According to some of our research participants, 
large working groups may be the best bet for creating 
a de facto protocol in the long-run, but some are slow 
to agree upon standards. The value of smaller-sized 
working groups is that players can move faster; the 
downside risks are lack of wider adoption or eventual 
obsolescence if a new standard or platform emerges 
in the industry. Data suggests, many global firms 
mitigate the risk of backing the wrong horse by 
participating in both large and small working groups.  
Enterprises in our study most commonly belonged 
to generic blockchain consortia, such as the 
Hyperledger Project and Enterprise Ethereum 
Alliance, as well as industry-focused consortia, such 
R3, B3i, and the Center for Supply Chain Studies (as 
mentioned above).  For example, BNP Paribas 
participated in both large and small consortia and had 
invested in several FinTechs to influence, learn, and 
contribute to blockchain initiatives. A large 
consortium like R3 was very valuable because it 
brings many financial institutions into the 
conversation. Jacques Levet said, “R3 is very useful 
because it's a way to organize discussions between 
the banks.  Banks have historically not been very 
good at doing that on their own, so having a third 
party who organizes that is quite useful.” BNP 
Paribas also joined two smaller consortia, with the 
goal that the banks will define standards and create a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) for FinTechs to develop 
the specified blockchain application [11].  
While the main tasks of these working groups are 
to identify blockchain standards, build code bases, 
and/or proof-of-concepts, participants are also 
struggling with challenges about adjusting to 
different shared governance models, industrial 
espionage risks, adequate protection of joint 
intellectual property (IP) and regulatory uncertainty.  
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4.2 Adjusting to Shared Governance Models 
“Business agreements are the hardest things. We 
need to have rules of entry and play that protect 
consumers and protect the overall ecosystem. Getting 
people to play ball, that's the real tough thing.” — 
Innovation Director for a US healthcare company 
“If the government had one iota how much fraud 
and abuse they could stop especially in 
pharmaceuticals, how they can purge the opioid 
thing, they would mandate blockchains tomorrow. It 
would be a mandated, you must participate on this 
within two years.” — Head of Innovation for a US 
healthcare company 
Both permissionless and permissioned blockchain 
applications rely upon shared governance models. No 
one entity should be able to unilaterally make 
decisions about changing the rules, upgrading the 
code base, or altering the immutable records or smart 
contracts.5  Our participants identified several 
potential types of shared governance models at the 
level of a blockchain application, including 
democratic, representative, or regulatory.  Each of 
these models have trade-offs. 
Practice 2. Carefully consider the trade-offs 
of shared governance models  
With a democratic shared governance model, each 
participating member has an equal vote in 
deliberations. The members debate, deliberate and 
ultimately vote on proposed upgrades or fixes to 
address unexpected events like breaches or 
unintentional consequences from poorly crafted smart 
contracts. Open source communities that govern 
Bitcoin and Etherum are examples of democratic 
governance models. In those blockchain applications, 
miners vote on major decisions.  The benefits of a 
democratic governance model are openness, which 
minimizes the threat of corruption, and power 
decentralization.  The downsides are minority voices 
are muffled and decision-making can take a long 
time.  When enough members disagree with the 
majority vote, hard forks in the blockchain can occur. 
Hard forks at Ethereum and Bitcoin are two 
prominent examples. Ethereum split into Ethereum 
and Ethereum Classic in June 2016 when the 
Ethereum community could not agree on how to 
handle an attack on a poorly worded smart contract; 
Bitcoin split into Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash in August 
2017 when the community could not agree on the 
                                                          
5 The only exceptions are under the circumstances 
in which an enterprise or a group of colluding 
enterprises operate at least 50 percent of the nodes. 
proposed increase in block size.  Their stories are 
important reminders of the implications of 
democratic governance. Specifically, an enterprise 
must be willing to defer to the community’s will and 
live with the consequences of its majority rule. 
With a representative shared governance model, 
decision makers are elected or appointed to their 
roles.  For example, a blockchain application in a 
pharmaceutical supply chain might have 
representatives from manufacturers, distributors, 
retail pharmacies and independent physicians who 
govern the application.  This model will be able to 
make decisions quicker than a democratic one, but 
cabals may form where representatives collude. For 
example, manufacturers might vote as a group 
against the will of the retail pharmacies.  
The governance might be relegated to a regulatory 
body. For example, participants in the Center for 
Supply Chain Studies envisioned that a regulatory 
body could allow any licensed pharmacies to 
participate in the shared blockchain application. In 
another context, one participant was helping a 
government with a blockchain application for 
passport control.  The Passport Control Office would 
regulate and govern the application. The benefits are 
guaranteed regulatory compliance, but the model is 
centralized in that it places trust in one institution. 
Overall, participants expressed concerns for any 
shared governance model. An enterprise may have a 
weighted vote in deliberations in proportion to their 
stake, but it will not be able to control them.  This is a 
major mind-shift for many participants in our study. 
4.3 Intellectual Property Concerns 
“Our industry is behind some other industries in 
our management of shared IP and our ability to 
collaborate and cooperate. We all jumped in to 
explore a use case and did some joint design thinking 
with two or three traditional competitors without 
thinking about who owns the intellectual capital that 
comes out the tail end of that workshop.” — 
Innovation Lead for a global bank 
Participants in our research expressed concerns 
about their working group’s intellectual property 
rights.  For example, a participant in the Center for 
Supply Chain Studies asked, “How do we protect the 
intellectual property we’ve built as a team?” The 
following practice emerged:  
Practice 3. Be sure to understand the working 
group’s IP policy  
Some consortia like the Hyperledger Project have 
visible IP policies, while others like R3 do not. For 
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example, Hyperledger’s charter includes a clearly 
worded IP clause that in part reads: 
“Members agree that all new inbound code 
contributions to HLP (Hyperledger Project) shall be 
made under the Apache License, Version 2.0. All 
contributions shall be accompanied by a Developer 
Certificate of Origin sign-off that is submitted 
through a Governing Board and LF-approved 
contribution process. Such contribution process will 
include steps to also bind non-Member Contributors 
and, if not self-employed, their employer, to the 
licenses expressly granted in the Apache License, 
Version 2.0 with respect to such contribution…  
Subject to available Project funds, HLP may 
engage The Linux Foundation to determine the 
availability of, and register, trademarks, service 
marks, and certification marks, which shall be owned 
by the LF [27].”  
R3’s IP policies were not available to the public as 
of May 2017.  An article by the Business Insider 
reported, “Details about R3’s share structure are not 
being disclosed, neither are details about the division 
of the intellectual property built atop the open-source 
Corda platform. However, Rutter (R3’s CEO) did 
explain that while Corda itself is being open-sourced, 
the results of experiments conducted with partners 
within the R3 lab would be guarded more closely 
[2].” 
According to participants, some consortia required 
members to sign non-disclosure agreements, but only 
one reported that their working group required 
participants to sign IP agreements. One interviewee 
from a large bank explained, “If you do highlight the 
need for some agreement [on shared IP], getting to 
common ground on what that agreement needs to 
look like and who should own the IP, it's sometimes 
weeks or even months in lead time. We as an industry 
need to work faster on those kind of repeatable 
processes.” 
4.4 Industrial Espionage Risks 
“The issue is that some companies are afraid that 
information that's being collected for the blockchain 
will be used for other purposes. So, let's say I'm a 
pharmacy. If I verified all the products I have on 
hand, I'm announcing my inventory.  Companies are 
concerned that this added intelligence could be used 
for other purposes such as contract negotiations, 
etc.”  — Bob Celeste, CEO and Founder of the 
Center for Supply Chain Studies 
Participants expressed concerns about industrial 
espionage. With one shared ledger, how do 
enterprises prevent other entities from extracting 
meta-patterns about their inventory levels, customers, 
or suppliers etc.?  Overall, participants believed 
technical solutions were the best ways to prevent 
industrial espionage: 
Practice 4. Design technical solutions to 
ensure confidentiality of data 
Several technical solutions have been proposed. 
For example, many permissioned blockchains use 
smart contracts to restrict access to a particular 
agreement to the trading partners. Participants who 
are not party to a given smart contract agreement 
would not be able to interpret the transactions 
associated with that agreement on the ledger. Some 
permissioned blockchains, such as Ripple, allow 
private messaging, and some permissioned 
blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric, allow side 
channels. Using Quorum as an example, participants 
can execute private and public smart contracts so that 
the ledger is segmented into a private state database 
and a public state database [18]. Within a single 
ledger, all nodes can view Quorum’s public states, 
but only those nodes party to private contracts can 
view private states. Such technical features did not 
alleviate all the participants’ concerns because most 
enterprises will participate in multiple trading 
agreements and may be able to infer confidential data 
across smart contracts or side channels. 
4.5 Regulatory Uncertainty 
“We don't know how the regulators are going to 
respond. At the end of the day, I think the early 
indications suggests that they're as intrigued by the 
value proposition associated with Blockchain as 
anybody. No regulator has come out of the gates 
telling you what you can and cannot do yet. That's a 
big unknown in our world.” — Head of a blockchain 
Center of Excellence for a global financial services 
firm. 
Regulators worldwide are examining the 
blockchain space. Some regulators are supportive, 
some are not, and still others have yet to deliberate. 
Many participants in this research wanted to educate 
regulators about blockchains, but at the same time, 
did not want regulators participating too closely in 
consortia lest their compliance weaknesses be 
exposed.  Among the 30 enterprises we examined, 
LO3 Energy and Moog, Inc. were the most proactive 
about working with regulators.  Both Lo3 Energy and 
Moog, Inc. serve as good examples of diverse 
organizations working actively with regulators. We 
briefly describe these organizations and how they are 
interfacing with regulators below to exemplify the 
below best practice. 
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Practice 5: Actively work with regulators 
LO3 Energy.  LO3 Energy was founded by 
Lawrence Orsini in 2012 in Brooklyn New York with 
a vision to create a transactive energy platform that 
will allow neighbors to produce and consume locally 
produced electricity. The company is building a 
platform where producers sell excess energy capacity 
from their solar panels directly to neighbors. The 
platform comprises hardware, such as smart meters, 
switches, and controllers, and software embedded in 
the meters based on a proprietary blockchain-based 
application with a customizable, mobile user 
interface. 
As LO3 continues to build and improve upon the 
platform, it is conducting live tests through a project 
called the Brooklyn Microgrid project. The Brooklyn 
Microgrid was running in a shadow market of 60 
prosumers and over 500 consumers by year-end 
2017.  Live transactions would occur once required 
licenses from regulators were obtained. 
 Orsini has worked very closely with regulators 
since the company’s launch. He’s met with regulators 
from the US at both the State and Federal levels, as 
well with regulators from Australia and Europe [16].  
He views his job as explaining the technology to help 
them understand what LO3’s blockchain enables: a 
local, renewable, efficient “microgrid” that operates 
separately, but alongside, the utility grid. He hired 
lawyers who understood regulatory requirements.  
Orsini said: “We’ve spent a fair amount of time and a 
decent amount of investment making sure that we can 
work within existing regulations. Lots of other people 
talking about doing something similar to us have 
never even considered how that impacts regulation. It 
takes a real strong team of regulatory attorneys to 
understand and be able to fit legally within the 
existing regulation [15].” Orsini was among a 
minority of research participants who praised 
regulators for being receptive. He said, “We have a 
very good relationship with the regulators. The 
regulators in New York are pretty excited about and 
engaged in what we're doing, particularly for the 
transactive energy platform [15].”  
Moog, Inc.  Moog Inc. is a $2.5 billion US 
precision manufacturer and provider of integrated 
control systems. The blockchain adoption story 
begins in Moog’s Transformative Technology 
division under Aircraft Controls. Colonel James 
Allen Regenor, Business Unit Director for 
Transformative Technologies, imagined the value of 
moving from centralized manufacturing to 
decentralized additive manufacturing, i.e., 3-D 
printing. He had flown fighter jets off of aircraft 
carriers, so he knew that when a part was not on 
board, the plane was grounded.  Why not put a 3-D 
printer onboard a carrier? 
The potential business value was enormous, such 
as significantly less downtime, lower inventory costs, 
lower customs fees, and lower shipping and 
transportation costs [25]. The challenges to realize 
such a decentralized manufacturing process—
particularly in such a highly regulated context—were 
equally as enormous.  Regenor explained, “With 3-D 
printing, you have to worry about complex parts 
being counterfeit. Anybody can print something that 
looks like the part they are holding in their hand. It 
won’t have the same material properties or the same 
characteristics, but the guy pulling it off the shelf will 
not know the difference [20].” 
Moog would need a decentralized network with the 
highest security.  Regenor and his team realized that 
blockchain technologies might be the ideal technical 
solution [19]. Moog is now building a platform-based 
business model for the entire lifecycle of 3-D printed 
parts from part design to part decommissioning called 
VeriPart.  Regenor was also an early advocate of 
getting regulations for verifying parts created by 
additive manufacturing. He needed the US 
government to create 3-D printing regulations for 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions. Regenor 
took the current federal regulations for electronic 
parts and substituted the word “electronic” for 
“additive manufacturing” and brought it to legislators 
[19]. Moog also informed the US House Armed 
Services Committee about the threat of counterfeiting 
for additive manufactured parts. Legislators 
understood the concern; the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2018 includes funds for additive 
manufacturing technology development and requires 
briefings on blockchain technologies from agencies 
[21].  
5. Discussion, Limitations, and 
Implications for Future Research 
“Most of the organizations that we're speaking to 
are at an exploratory phase.  Pretty much saying, 
'we're trying to understand this'. Very few have really 
identified use cases that they're going to production 
scale and get a critical mass of partners on within the 
next six to ten months.” —Practice Head for FS 
Analytics & Blockchain at a global consulting firm 
“We're definitely several years away from large 
applications. A few applications will be in production 
maybe in three years. But mass production won’t 
likely be here for five years.” — Nilesh Vaidya, SVP 
Head of Banking & Capital Market Solutions at 
Capgemini 
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Our study identified some challenges that need to 
be addressed before enterprises can deploy and scale 
blockchain applications across processes, industries 
and geographies. As indicated by the quotes above, 
solving these challenges will take time.  Our paper 
contributed to practice by highlighting five 
approaches organizations are using to address those 
challenges.  
However, an important limitation of this paper is 
that it does not include a discussion of technical 
challenges and efforts to address them. The technical 
underpinnings are indeed likely to play a significant 
role in the eventual business adoption and impacts of 
blockchain technologies. We hope future studies 
could include both technical and non-technical 
challenges in the study of blockchain adoptions and 
impacts. Despite this limitation, this study also has 
some important implications for research. 
A long and robust stream of Information Systems 
literature has addressed various aspects of 
interorganizational systems [1, 13, 22]. Studies have 
examined the antecedents to adoption of 
interorganizational systems and their impacts on the 
governance of economic transactions. Yet others 
have studied the organizational impacts of adoption 
in terms of strategic, operational, and social aspects 
[22]. Within this broad literature, a variety of 
technologies underpinning interorganizational 
systems have been the subject study; from earlier 
studies on Electronic Data Interchange [5], to studies 
of both closed and open standards based technologies 
[22].  
While our findings indicate some parallels with this 
broad literature, we believe that, broadly speaking, 
blockchain based IT artifacts [cf. 22] could indeed 
potentially alter both practice and research on 
interorganizational systems in fundamental ways. 
Some recent expositions argue that given the very 
nature of blockchain technologies (e.g., distributed 
ledger, transparency etc.) fundamentals notions such 
as trust, within and between organizations, and 
organizational structures could now be reexamined 
[e.g., 24]. Similarly, others [e.g., 17] argue that 
blockchain technologies enable new systems of value 
that require a new economic model. 
Due to space limitations, we briefly discuss some 
important implications of our findings in relation to 
the literature on interorganizational systems. Our 
findings suggest an interesting set of developments 
related to competing standards and working 
groups/consortia for blockchain. Not only are 
organizations participating in multiple such groups 
due to the current flux and uncertainty in predicting 
dominant standard paradigms, they are also actively 
shaping those standards and tools that make adoption 
easier. While scholars have compared the evolution 
of blockchain standards to the earlier standard wars 
from the Internet age [9], our data suggests that 
standardization processes are being shaped by a 
variety of organizational and environmental 
characteristics and the previous pattern of standards 
guiding the nature of interorganizational systems [5] 
is less evident. Instead, organizational characteristics 
such as industry and size or geographic boundaries 
are at least interacting with how the standards 
themselves will be developed as organizations appear 
to have flipped the model where use-case 
brainstorming and proof-of-concepts are also driving 
the work of consortia in code base and tool 
development. 
Another important aspect relates to our findings on 
how organizations are adjusting to new governance 
structures, figuring out IP protecting models, and 
managing risks of espionage to business 
competitiveness. It is the well-studied notion in the IS 
literature that interorganizational systems have 
consequences for relationship structures between 
organizations [13, 22] and the reverse, where 
relationship structures and characteristics such as 
power differences and network centrality have 
shaped the nature of interorganizational systems [13]. 
Our respondents indicated that they are undergoing 
dramatic mind-shifts in how they approach traditional 
notions of governance, protection of intellectual 
property, and espionage risks to competitiveness. In 
other words, the nature of the blockchain based 
artifacts indeed suggest that future research must shift 
focus to new and refined models of relationship 
structures and configurations of organizations. 
Models where traditional notions of power, 
centrality, information asymmetries, trust, structural 
arrangements and configurations [13], etc. would 
either play a different role in adoptions of 
interorganizational systems and in the consequences 
of adoptions or be replaced with newer notions 
surrounding distributed power and structural 
configurations [13], transparency and willingness to 
share in light of potential information leakages [1], 
elimination or at least side-tracking of powerful 
intermediaries; among many others [9, 10]. As Iansiti 
and Lakhani [9] aptly note, blockchain technologies 
could stand to deliver on the long awaited and 
debated changes in the way we regulate and maintain 
administrative control in the digital age.  
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